Abstract. The Bitcoin backbone protocol [Eurocrypt 2015] extracts basic properties of Bitcoin's underlying blockchain data structure, such as common prex and chain quality, and shows how fundamental applications including consensus and a robust public transaction ledger can be built on top of them. The underlying assumptions are proofs of work (POWs), adversarial hashing power strictly less than 1/2 and no adversarial pre-computationor, alternatively, the existence of an unpredictable genesis block.
Introduction
As the rst decentralized cryptocurrency, Bitcoin [33] has ignited much excitment, not only for its novel realization of a central bank-free nancial instrument, but also as an alternative approach to classical distributed computing problems, such as reaching agreement distributedly in the presence of misbehaving parties.
Formally capturing such reach has been the intent of several recent works, notably [21] , where the core of the Bitcoin protocol, called the Bitcoin backbone, is extracted and analyzed. The analysis includes the formulation of fundamental properties of its underlying blockchain data structure, which parties (miners)
Research partly supported by ERC project CODAMODA, No. 259152, and Horizon maintain and try to extend by generating proofs of work (POW, aka cryptographic puzzle [16,37,3,24]) 4 , called common prex and chain quality. It is then shown in [21] how applications such as consensus (aka Byzantine agreement) [36, 31] and a robust public transaction ledger (i.e., Bitcoin) can be built on top of such properties, assuming that the hashing power of an adversary controlling a fraction of the parties is strictly less than 1/2.
Importantly, those properties hold assuming that all partieshonest and adversarialwake up and start computing at the same time, or, alternatively, that they compute on a common random string only made available at the exact time when the protocol execution is to begin (see further discussion under related work below). Indeed, the coinbase parameter in Bitcoin's genesis block, hardcoded into the software, contains text from The Times 03/Jan/2009 issue [5] , arguably unpredictable.
While satisfactory in some cases, such a trusted setup/behavioral assumption might be unrealistic in other POW-based systems where details may have been released a lot earlier than the actual time when the system starts to run. A case in point is Ethereum, which was discussed for over a year before the system ocially kicked o. That's from a practical point of view. At a foundational level, one would in addition like to understand what kind of cryptographic primitives can be realized without any trusted setup assumption and based on POWs, and whether that is in particular the case for the Bitcoin backbone functionality and its enabling properties mentioned above.
The former question was recently considered by Andrychowicz and Dziembowski [1] , who, building on previous suggestions by Aspnes et al. [2] of using POWs as an identity-assignment tool and constructions by Fitzi et al. [19, 12] showing how to morph graded consistency into global consistency, showed how to create a consistent PKI using POWs and no other trusted setup, which can then be used to run secure computation protocols (e.g., [38, 23] ) and realize any cryptographic functionality assuming an honest majority among parties.
While this in principle addresses the foundational concerns, it leaves open the questions of doing it in scalable wayi.e., with round complexity independent of the number of parties, and in the context of blockchain protocols in particular, designing one that is provably secure without a trusted setup.
Our contributions. In this paper we answer the above questions. First, we present a Bitcoin-like protocol that neither assumes a simultaneous start nor the existence of an unpredictable genesis block, and has round complexity essentially independent of the number of participants 5 . Eectively, the protocol, starting from scratch, enables the coexistence of multiple genesis blocks with blockchains stemming from them, eventually enabling the players to converge to 4 In Bitcoin, solving a proof of work essentially amounts to brute-forcing a hash inequality based on SHA-256. 5 Essentially because even though there will be a dependency of the round complexity of the setup phase on the probability of computing POWs, which in turn depends on the number of parties, this dependency can be made small enough so as to be considered a constant. See Remark 3. a single blockchain. This takes place despite the adversary being allowed (polynomial in the security parameter) pre-computation time. We work in the same model as [21] and we assume a 1/2 bound on adversarial hashing power. We call this protocol the bootstrapped (Bitcoin) backbone protocol. A pictorial overview of the protocol's phases, preceded by a period of potential precomputation by the corrupt players, is given in Figure 1 . Second, we present applications of our bootstrapped construction, starting with its original one: a distributed ledger, i.e., a public and permanent summary of all transactions that honest parties can agree on as well as add their own, despite the potentially disruptive behavior of parties harnessing less than 1/2 of the hashing power. This entails proving that the ledger's required security properties (Persistence and Liveness cf. [21] ) hold in a genesis block-less setting.
Next, we consider the problem of setting up a PKI in our unauthenticated network setting from scratch. As mentioned above, the idea of using POWs as an identity-assignment tool was put forth by Aspnes et al. [2] . Here we build on this idea as well as on the 2-for-1 POWs technique from [21] to use our bootstrapped protocol to assign identities to parties. The assignment relation will possibly assign more than one identity to the same party, while guaranteeing that the majority of them is assigned to honest parties. Such an identity infrastructure/pseudonymous PKI has numerous applications, including the bootstrapping of a proof-of-stake protocol [28, 30] , and the election of honestmajority subcommittees, which would enable the application of traditional Byzantine fault-tolerant techniques for ledger creation and maintenance (cf. [7] ) to permissionless (as opposed to permissioned) networks.
Finally, applying the 2-for-1 POWs technique we can also solve the consensus (aka Byzantine agreement) problem [36, 31] probabilistically and from scratch, even if the adversary has almost the same hashing power as the honest parties 6 , and with round complexity independent of the number of parties. Indeed, all our protocols have round complexity linear in the security parameter, and enjoy simultaneous termination. We conclude with an additional modication to the protocol that reduces (by a factor of n) the protocol's communication costs.
Related work. Nakamoto [32] proposed Bitcoin, the rst decentralized currency system based on POWs while relaxing the anonymity property of a digital 6 Thus marking a contrast with the 2 3 lower bound for consensus on the number of honest parties in the traditional network setting with no setup [6] .
3 currency to mere pseudonymity. This work was followed by a multitude of other related proposals including Litecoin, Primecoin [29] , and Zerocash [4] , and further analysis improvements (e.g., [18, 17] ), to mention a few.
As mentioned above, we work in a model that generalizes the model put forth by Garay et al. [21] , who abstracted out and formalized the core of the Bitcoin protocolthe Bitcoin backbone. As presented in [21] , however, the protocol considers as valid any chain that extends the empty chain, which is not going to work in our model. Indeed, if the adversary is allowed polynomial-time pre-computation, he can prepare a very long, private chain; then, by revealing blocks of this chain at the rate that honest players compute new blocks, he can break security. As also mentioned above, to overcome this problem one can assume that at the time honest parties start the computation, they have access to a fresh common random string (a genesis block). Then, if we consider as valid only the chains that extend this block, all results proved in [21] follow, since the probability that the adversary can use blocks mined before honest players woke up is negligible in the security parameter. In this paper we show how to establish such genesis block directly, and in a number of rounds essentially independent of the number of participants.
To our knowledge, the idea of using POWs to distributedly agree on something (specically, a PKI) in an unauthenticated setting with no trusted setup was rst put forth by Aspnes et al. [2] , who suggested to use them as an identityassignment tool as a way to combat Sybil attacks [14] , and in such a way that the number of identities assigned to the honest and adversarial parties can be made proportional to their aggregate computational power, respectively. For example, by assuming that the adversary's computational power is less than 50%, one of the algorithms in [2] results in a number of adversarial identities less than half of that obtained by the honest parties. By running this procedure in a pre-processing stage, it is then suggested in [2] that a standard authenticated broadcast protocol (specically, the one by Dolev and Strong [13] ) could be run.
Such protocols, however, would require that the PKI be consistent, details of which are not laid out in [2] .
They are in [1] , where Andrychowicz and Dziembowski address the more general goal of secure computation in this setting based on POWs, as mentioned earlier; the POWs are used to build a graded PKI, where keys have ranks.
The graded PKI is an instance of a graded agreement, or partial consistency problem [19, 12, 20] , where honest parties do not disagree by much, according to some metric. In [19] , Fitzi calls this the b-set-neighboring problem (proxcast in [12] ), with b the number of possible grades, and shows how to achieve global consistency by running the b-set-neighboring protocol multiple times. In [1] , the fact is used that an unreliable broadcast is available among honest parties to achieve the sameglobal consistency on a PKI, where the number of identities each party gets is proportional to its hashing power, as suggested in [2] .
The protocol in [1] , however, suers from a total running time that depends on the number of parties, because of two factors: (1) the way in which it uses POWs, and (2) the use of the Dolev-Strong authenticated broadcast protocol 4 (run multiple times in parallel based on the graded PKI), which takes a linear number of rounds. Regarding (1) , and in more detail, in order to assign exactly one key per party, a low variance POW scheme is used. This implies that the time needed by an honest party to mine a POW is going to be proportional to the ratio of the adversarial hashing power to the hashing power of the weakest honest party. Otherwise, the rushing adversary would be able to compute more identities in the additional time she has due to the latency of the communication infrastructure.
7 Regarding (2), we note that potentially an expected-constantround protocol could be used instead of Dolev-Strong, although the parallel composition of n instances would require more involved techniques [11] .
Furthermore, having a PKI allows parties to generate an unpredictable beacon (in the random oracle model), which is then suggested in [1] as a genesis block-generation method for a new cryptocurrency. Yet, no formal treatment of the security of the resulting blockchain protocol is presented, andas already mentionedthe round complexity of the suggested genesis block generation procedure is linear in the number of participants, both in contrast to our work.
As in [1] , Katz et al. [26] also consider achieving pseudonymous broadcast and secure computation from POWs (cryptographic puzzles) and the existence of digital signatures without prior PKI setup, but under the assumption of an existing unpredictable beacon. Finally, Pass et al. [35] consider a partially synchronous model of communication where parties are not guaranteed to receive messages at the end of each round but rather after a specied delay ∆ (cf. [15] ), and show that the backbone protocol can be proven secure in this setting. In principle, our results about the bootstrapped backbone protocol can be extended to their setting as shown in [22] .
Organization of the paper. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the network and adversarial model, introduce some basic blockchain notation, and enumerate the various security properties. In Section 3
we present the bootstrapped Bitcoin backbone protocol and its analysis. Applications are presented in Section 4: a robust public transaction ledger, and PKI generation and consensus without trusted setup and with round complexity independent of the number of parties. Due to space limitations, some of the proofs and further details are presented in the full version of the paper.
Model and Denitions
We describe our protocols in a model that extends the synchronous communication network model presented in [21] for the analysis of the Bitcoin backbone protocol (which in turn is based on Canetti's formulation of real world execution for multi-party cryptographic protocols [8, 9] ). As in [21] , the protocol 7 On the ip side, the benet of the approach in [1] is that when all honest parties have the same hashing power, a PKI that maps each party to exactly one identity and preserves an honest majority on the keys can be achieved. However, in today's environments where even small devices (e.g., mobile phones, smart watches) have powerful CPUs with dierent clock frequencies, this assumption is arguably weak.
execution proceeds in rounds with inputs provided by an environment program denoted by Z to parties that execute the protocol.
Next we provide a high level overview of the model, focusing on the dierences that are intrinsic to our setting where the adversary has a precomputation advantage. The adversarial model in the network is actively malicious following the standard cryptographic approach. The adversary is rushing, meaning that in any given round it gets to see all honest players's messages before deciding its strategy. Message delivery is provided by a diusion mechanism that is guaranteed to deliver all messages, without however preserving their order and allowing the adversary to arbitrarily inject its own messages. Importantly, the honest parties are not guaranteed to have the same view of the messages delivered in each round, except for the fact that all honest messages from the previous round are delivered. Furthermore, the adversary is allowed to change the source information on every message (i.e., communication is not authenticated). In the protocol description, we will use Diffuse as the message transmission command to capture the send-to-all functionality that is available in our setting.
8 Note that, as in [21] , an adversarial sender may abuse Diffuse and attempt to confuse honest parties by sending and delivering inconsistent messages to them.
In contrast to [21] , where all parties (the honest ones and the ones controlled by the adversary), are activated for the rst time in the execution of the protocol in the same round 9 , in our model the environment will choose the round at which all the honest parties will become active; the corrupted parties, on the other hand, are activated in the rst round. Once honest parties become active they will remain active until the end of the execution. In each round, after the honest parties become active, the environment activates each one by providing input to the party and receives the party's output when it terminates. When activated, parties are able to read their input tape Input() and communication tape Receive(), perform some computation that will be suitably restricted (see below) and issue a Diffuse message that is guaranteed to be delivered to all parties at the beginning of the next round.
In more detail, we model the execution in the following manner. We employ the parameterized system of ITM's from [9] (2013 version) that is comprised of an initial ITM Z, called the environment, and C, a control function that is specied below. We remark that our control function C is suitably restricted compared to that of [9, 10] to take into account restrictions in the order of execution that are relevant to our setting.
The execution is dened with respect to a protocol Π, a set of parties P 1 , . . . , P n and an adversary A. The adversary is allowed to corrupt parties adaptively up to a number of t < n. The protocol Π has access to two resources or ideal functionalities, the random oracle, and the diusion channel. Initially, the environment may pass input to either the adversary A or spawn an instance 8 In [21] the command name Broadcast is used for this functionality, which we sometimes also will use informally.
9 After their rst-time activation, the environment keeps activating parties in every round (cf. [8] ).
running the protocol Π which will be restricted to be assigned to the lexicographically smallest honest party (such restrictions are imposed by the control function [9] ). After a party P i is activated, the environment is restricted to activate the lexicographically next honest party, except in the case when no such party is left, in which case the next program to be activated is the adversary A; subsequently, the round-robin execution order between the honest parties will be repeated.
Whenever a party is activated the control function allows forueries to be made to the random oracle while in the case of an activation of A a number of t·q queries are allowed where t is the number of corrupted parties. Honest parties are also allowed to annotate their queries to the random oracle for verication purposes, in which case an unlimited amount of queries is permitted (that still counts towards the overall running time of the system execution). Note that the adversary is not permitted to take advantage of this feature of the execution.
With foresight, this asymmetry will be necessary, since otherwise it would be trivial for the adversary to break the properties of our protocols by simply jamming the incoming communication tape of the honest parties with messages whose verication would deplete their access quota to the random oracle per activation. Furthermore, for each party a single invocation to the diusion channel is permitted. The diusion channel maintains the list of messages diused by each party, and permits the adversary A to perform a fetch operation so that it obtains the messages that were sent. When the adversary A is activated, the adversary will interact with the diusion channel, preparing the messages to be delivered to the parties and performing a fetch operation. This write and fetch mode of operation with the communication channel enables the channel to enforce synchrony among the parties running the protocol (cf. [25] ).
The term {view P Π,A,Z (κ, z)} κ∈N,z∈{0,1} * denotes the random variable ensemble describing the view of party P after the completion of an execution with environment Z, running protocol Π, and adversary A, on auxiliary input z ∈ {0, 1} * . We often drop the parameters κ and z and simply refer to the ensemble by view P Π,A,Z if the meaning is clear from the context. Following the resource-bounded computation model of [9] , it holds that the total length of the execution is bounded by a polynomial in the security parameter κ and the length of the auxiliary string |z|, provided that the environment is locally bounded by a polynomial (cf. Proposition 3 in [9] ). Note that the above execution model captures adversarial precomputation since it permits the environment to activate the adversary an arbitrary number of times (bounded by a polynomial in the security parameter κ of course) before the round-robin execution of the honest parties commences.
We note that the above modeling obviates the need for a strict upper bound on the number of messages that may be transmitted by the adversary in each activation (as imposed by [1] ). In our setting, honest parties, at the discretion of the environment, will be given sucient time to process all the messages delivered via the diusion channel including all messages that are injected by the adversary.
The concatenation of the view of all parties ever activated in the execution, say, P 1 , . . . , P n , is denoted by view Π,A,Z . As in [21] , we are interested in protocols Π that do not make explicit use of the number of parties n or their identities.
Further, note that because of the unauthenticated nature of the communication model the parties may never be certain about the number of participants in a protocol execution.
In our correctness and security statements we will be concerned with properties of protocols Π running in the above setting (as opposed to simulation-based notions of security). Such properties will be dened as predicates over the random variable view Π,A,Z (κ, q, z) by quantifying over all locally polynomial-bounded adversaries A and environments Z (in the sense of [9] ). Note that all our protocols will only satisfy properties with a small probability of error in κ as well as in a parameter k that is selected from {1, . . . , κ}. (Note that, in practice, one may choose k to be much smaller than κ, e.g., k = 6.)
Blockchain notation
Next, we introduce some basic blockchain notation, following [21] . A block is any triple of the form B = s, x, ctr where s ∈ {0, 1} κ , x ∈ {0, 1} * , ctr ∈ N are such that satisfy predicate validblock
where H, G are cryptographic hash functions (e.g., SHA-256) modelled as random oracles. The parameter D ∈ N is also called the block's diculty level. The parameter q ∈ N is a bound that in the Bitcoin implementation determines the size of the register ctr; in our treatment we allow this to be arbitrary, and use it to denote the maximum allowed number of hash queries in a round. We do this for convenience and our analysis applies in a straightforward manner to the case that ctr is restricted to the range 0 ≤ ctr < 2 32 and q is independent of ctr.
A blockchain, or simply a chain is a sequence of blocks. The rightmost block is the head of the chain, denoted head(C). Note that the empty string ε is also a chain; by convention we set head(ε) = ε. A chain C with head(C) = s , x , ctr can be extended to a longer chain by appending a valid block B = s, x, ctr that satises s = H(ctr , G(s , x )). In case C = ε, by convention any valid block of the form s, x, ctr may extend it. In either case we have an extended chain C new = CB that satises head(C new ) = B. Consider a chain C of length m and any nonnegative integer k. We denote by C k the chain resulting from the pruning of the k rightmost blocks. Note that for k ≥ len(C),
Basic security properties of the blockchain
We are going to show that the blockchain data structure built by our protocol satises a number of basic properties, as formulated in [21, 27] . At a high level, the rst property, called common prex, has to do with the existence, as well as persistence in time, of a common prex of blocks among the chains of honest players [21] . Here we will consider a stronger variant of the property, presented in [27, 34] , which allows for the black-box proof of application-level properties (such as the persistence of transactions entered in a public transaction ledger built on top of the Bitcoin backbonecf. Section 4).
Denition 1 ((Strong) Common Prex Property). The strong common prex property Q cp with parameter k ∈ N states that the chains C 1 , C 2 reported by two, not necessarily distinct honest parties P 1 , P 2 , at rounds r 1 , r 2 , with r 1 ≤ r 2 , satisfy C k 1
The next property relates to the proportion of honest blocks in any portion of some honest player's chain.
Denition 2 (Chain Quality Property). The chain quality property Q cq with parameters µ ∈ R and k, k 0 ∈ N states that for any honest party P with chain C in view Π,A,Z (κ, z), it holds that for any k consecutive blocks of C, excluding the rst k 0 blocks, the ratio of adversarial blocks is at most µ.
Further, in the derivations in [21] an important lemma was established relating to the rate at which the chains of honest players were increasing as the Bitcoin backbone protocol was run. This was explicitly considered in [27] as a property under the name chain growth. Similarly to the variant of the common prex property above, this property along with chain quality were shown sucient for the black-box proof of application-level properties (in this case, transaction ledger liveness; see Section 4).
Denition 3 (Chain Growth Property). The chain growth property Q cg with parameters τ ∈ R (the chain speed coecient) and s, r 0 ∈ N states that for any round r > r 0 , where honest party P has chain C 1 at round r and chain
The Bootstrapped Backbone Protocol
We begin this section by presenting the bootstrapped Bitcoin backbone protocol, followed by its security analysis. In a nutshell, the protocol is a generalization of the protocol in [21] , which is enhanced in two ways: (1) an initial challengeexchange phase, in which parties contribute random values, towards the establishment of an unpredictable genesis block, despite the precomputation eorts of corrupt players, and (2) a ranking process and chain-validation predicate that, in addition to its basic function (checking the validity of a chain's content), enables the identication of fresh candidate genesis blocks. The ranking process yields a graded list of genesis blocks and is inpired by the key ranking protocol in [1] , where it is used to produce a graded PKI, as mentioned in Section 1.
Before describing the bootstrapped backbone protocol in detail, we highlight its unique features.
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No trusted setup and individual genesis block mining. Parties start without any prior coordination and enter an initial challenge-exchange phase, where they will exchange random values that will be used to construct freshness proofs for candidate genesis blocks. The parties will run the initial challengeexchange phase for a small number of rounds, and subsequently will try to mine their own genesis blocks individually. Once they mine or accept a genesis block from the network they will engage in mining further blocks and exchanging blockchains as in Bitcoin's blockchain protocol. On occasion they might switch to a chain with a dierent genesis block. Nevertheless, as we will show, quite soon they will stabilize in a common prex and a single genesis block.
Freshness of genesis block impacts chains' total weight. Chains rooted at a genesis block will incorporate its weight in their total valuation. Genesis blocks can be quite heavy compared to regular blocks and their total valuation will depend on how fresh they are. Their weight in general might be as much as a linear number of regular blocks in the security parameter.
Furthermore, each regular block in a chain accounts for 3 units in terms of the total weight of the chain, something that, as we show, will be crucial to account for dierences in terms of weight that are assigned to the same genesis block by dierent parties running the protocol (cf. Remark 1).
Personalized chain selection rule. Given the co-existence of multiple genesis blocks, a ranking process is incorporated into the chain selection rule that, in addition to its basic function (checking the validity of a chain's content) and picking the longest chain, it now also takes into account the freshness degree of a genesis block from the perspective of each player running the protocol.
The ranking process eectively yields a graded list of genesis blocks and is inspired by the key ranking protocol in [1] , where it is used to produce a graded PKI (see further discussion below). The weight value for each genesis block will be thus proportional to its perceived freshness by each party running the protocol (the fresher the block the higher its weight). It follows that honest players use dierent chain selection procedures since each predicate is keyed with the random coins that were contributed by each player in the challenge-exchange phase (and thus guaranteed to be fresh from the player's perspective). This has the side eect that the same genesis block might be weighed dierently by dierent parties. Despite these dierences, we show that eventually all parties accept the same chains as valid and hence will unify their chain selection rule in the course of the protocol.
Robustness is achieved after an initial period of protocol stabilization. All our modications integrate seamlessly with the Bitcoin backbone protocol [21] , and we are able to show that our blockchain protocol is a robust transaction ledger, in the sense of satisfying the properties of persistence and liveness.
Nevertheless, contrary to [21] , the properties are satised only after an initial period of rounds where persistence is uncertain and liveness might be slower; this is the period where the parties still stabilize the genesis block and they might be more susceptible to attacks. Despite this, a ledger built on top of our blockchain will be available immediately after the challenges exchange phase. Furthermore, once the stabilization period is over the robust transaction ledger behavior is guaranteed with overwhelming probability (in the length of the security parameter).
Protocol Description
The bootstrapped Bitcoin backbone protocol is executed by an arbitrary number of parties over an unauthenticated network (cf. Section 2). For concreteness, we assume that the number of parties running the protocol is n; however, parties need not be aware of this number when they execute the protocol. Communication over the network is achieved by utilizing a send-to-all Diffuse functionality that is available to all parties (and may be abused by the adversary in the sense of delivering dierent messages to dierent parties). After an initial (challenge) phase, each party is to maintain a data structure called a blockchain, as dened above. Each party's chain may be dierent, but, as we will prove, under certain well-dened conditions, the chains of honest parties will share a large common prex.
The protocol description intentionally avoids specifying the type of values that parties try to insert in the chain, the type of chain validation they perform (beyond checking for its structural properties with respect to the hash functions G(·), H(·)), and the way they interpret the chain. In the protocol description, these actions are abstracted by the external functions V (·), I(·), R(·) which are specied by the application that runs on top of the backbone protocol.
The protocol is specied as Algorithm 1. At a high level, the protocol rst executes a challenge-exchange phase for l + 1 rounds (l will be determined later), followed by the basic backbone functions, i.e., mining and broadcasting blocks; a crucial dierence here with respect to the original backbone protocol is that the chain validation process must also verify candidate genesis blocks, which in turn requires updating the validation function as the protocol proceeds. (This, however, only happens in the next l rounds after the challenge phase.) The protocol's supporting algorithms are specied next.
The challenge-exchange phase. In order to generate an unpredictable genesis block, players rst execute a challenge-exchange phase, where they broadcast, for a given number of rounds (l + 1), randomly generated challenges that depend on the challenges received in the previous rounds. The property that is assured is that an honest player's k-round challenge, 1 ≤ k ≤ l, depends on the (k − 1)-round challenges of all honest players. This dependence is made explicit through the random oracle. The code of the challenge-exchange phase is shown in Algorithm 2.
Validation predicate update. In the original backbone protocol [21] , the chain validation function (called validatesee below) performs a validation of the structural properties of a given chain C, and remains unchanged throughout the protocol. In our case, however, where there is no initial fresh common random string, the function plays the additional role of checking for valid genesis blocks, Algorithm 1 The bootstrapped backbone protocol, parameterized by the input contribution function I(·), the chain reading function R(·), and parameter l. 
MGen ← {( s , x , ctr , A l+1 , . . . , A l+1−k )} from Receive() 10 :
(Gen, Rank) ← updateValidate(c, A, MGen, Gen, Rank) 12:C ← maxvalid(C, M Chain , Gen, Rank) 13: st, x ← I(st,C, round, Input(), Receive()) 14: Cnew ← pow(x,C, c) 
8: Gen ← Gen ∪ s, x, ctr 13:
Augment A sequence with own A value. 
s, x, ctr ← head(C) 5: s ← H(ctr, G(s, x))
s, x, ctr ← head(C)
Retain hash value and remove the head from C weight ← Rank(tail(Ci)) + 3(|Ci| − 1)
7:
if maxweight < weight then 8:
temp ← Ci 10:
return temp
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The proof-of-work function. Finally, we need to modify the proof-of-work function in [21] , so that when a genesis block is mined, the challenge computed in the last round of the challenge-exchange phase will be included in the block. This, in addition to the proof of genesis information sent in the backbone protocol, is required so that other honest players accept this block as valid and rank it accordingly. The code is presented in Algorithm 6.
Algorithm 6 The proof of work function, parameterized by q, D and hash functions H(·), G(·). The input is (x, C, c). s , x , ctr ← head(C)
s ← H(ctr , G(s , x ))
ctr ← 1 8:
h ← G(s, x)
10:
Proof of work found
12:
B ← s, x, ctr ctr ← ctr + 1
15:
return CB Extend chain Figure 2 presents the overall structure (phases and corresponding rounds) of the bootstrapped backbone protocol. Next, we turn to its analysis. Remark 1. To understand some of our design choices we briey give some examples of simpler protocols that don't work. For the rst example, assume that we only have one round of challenge exchange i.e. l equal to 1. With some nonnegligible probability, the adversary can send one block to half of the honest players and another block to the other half. By splitting the honest players in two groups such that no one in the rst group will choose the chain of the second and vice versa, agreement becomes impossible. Moreover, l must be large enough so that at least one honest party computes a genesis block with overwhelming probability. Otherwise the adversary can choose to remain silent and no genesis block will be mined with non-negligible probability.
For the second example assume that blocks weigh less than 3 units, as in the original protocol. Also, assume that somehow the problem of the rst example was avoided and honest parties only adopted chains with genesis blocks that everyone had in their genesis block list. In this case, uniquely successful rounds would not imply agreement on a single chain (see Figure 3) , as the adversary would have been able to take advantage of the dierent views that honest players have regarding the weight of genesis blocks. However, if we set the block weight to 3, this event becomes impossible and makes the analysis a lot easier. Fig. 3 . An example where blocks weigh 2 units. In the table the weights of the respective chains are depicted. Initially player P1 has adopted chain C1 and player P2 chain C2. Then a uniquely successful round happens and C2 is extended to C 2 . Notice that, P1 will not adopt C 2 since it has the same weight as C1. If the new block weighted 3 units, all players would have adopted chain C 2 .
Analysis of the Bootstrapped Backbone Protocol
First, some additional denitions that will become handy in the analysis. We saw in the previous section that genesis blocks are assigned weights, and, further, that a single genesis block may have dierent weights for dierent parties depending on when they received it. We extend this notion to chains of blocks.
Denition 4. Let w P (B) be the weight that P assigned to genesis block B. We dene the weight of a chain C with genesis block B (with respect to party P )to be:
w P (C) = w P (B) + 3(|C| − 1).
If block B was not received by P until round 2l+1, or if C = , then w P (C) = −1.
In [21] , all parties assign the same weight to the same chain, i.e., the length of the chain; thus, for all parties P i , P j we have that w Pi (C) = w Pj (C). In contrast, in our case the genesis block of each chain may have dierent weight for dierent parties, akin to some bounded amount of noise that is party-dependent being added to the chain weights. We are going to show that if the amount of noise is at most 1, then by letting each new block weigh 3 units our protocol satises the chain growth, common prex and chain quality properties.
Denition 5. Regarding chains and their weight:
Dene h C = max P {w P (C)} and C = min P {w P (C)}. Let C(B) denote the truncation of chain C after its block B.
For a block B of a chain C, dene h C (B) = h C(B) and similarly for C (B).
(Sometimes we will abuse notation and write (B) instead of C (B). As long as no collision happens (B) is well dened. The same holds for h(B).)
For chains C 1 and C 2 , dene C 1 ∩ C 2 to be the chain formed by their common prex.
The following are important concepts introduced in [21] , which we are also going to use in our analysis: Recall that our model is at in terms of computational power in the sense that all honest parties are assumed to have the same computational power while the adversary has computational power proportional to the number of players that it controls. The total number of parties is n and the adversary is assumed to control up to t of them (honest parties do not know any of these parameters).
Obtaining a new block is achieved by nding a hash value that is smaller than the diculty parameter D. Thus, the success probability that a single hash query produces a solution is p = D 2 κ , where κ is the length of the hash. The total hashing power of the honest players is α = pq(n − t), the hashing power of the adversary is β = pqt, and the total hashing power is f = α + β. Moreover, in [21] , a lower bound on the probability that a round is uniquely successful was established; denoted by γ and equal to α − α 2 . Notice that γ is also a bound for the probability of a round being just successful.
For each round j, we dene the Boolean random variables X j and Y j as follows. Let X j = 1 i j was a successful round, i.e., at least one honest party computed a POW at round j, and let Y j = 1 i j was a uniquely successful round, i.e., exactly one honest party computed a POW at round j. With respect to a set of rounds S, let Z(S) denote the number of POWs obtained by the adversary during the rounds in S (i.e., in qt|S| queries). Also, let X(S) = j∈S X j and dene Y (S) similarly.
Proof. By the Cherno bound we have that:
Suppose none of the above events happens. Then, from the union bound, we get that with probability 1 − e −(2 min(
Remark 2. For ease of exposition, in our analysis we will assume that there are no collisions; that is, for any two dierent queries to the random oracle, always a dierent response is returned. This would generally be a problem since for example it would break independence of X i , X j , for i = j, and we would not be able to apply the Cherno bound in the previous lemma. However, since the probability of a collision happening, as well as all other events we consider, is at most e −Ω(κ) , we can always use the union bound to include the event of no collision occurring to our other assumptions. In addition, we assume that no two queries to the oracle are the same, as formalized by the Input Entropy condition in [21] .
Properties of the genesis block generation process. We now establish a number of properties of the genesis block generation process.
Lemma 2 (Graded Consistency). If any honest party P i accepts genesis block B with rank w Pi (B) > 1, then all honest parties accept B with rank at least w Pi (B) − 1.
Proof. Let w Pi (B) = k > 1. Since P i accepted B with rank k at some round r, he must have received a message of the form (B, E l+1 , .., E k+1 ), where B is a valid block that contains H(E l+1 ); E k+1 contains c k and for k + 2 < j ≤ l + 1, E j contains H(E j−1 ); and c k is the challenge computed by P i at round k. Since k > 0, according to Algorithm 3, P i is going to broadcast (B, E l+1 , .., E k+1 , A k ), where H(A k ) = c k is contained in E k+1 and A k contains all the messages received by P i at round k. All honest-party challenges of round k − 1 were received in this round; therefore, all honest parties have accepted or will accept block B by the next round and the lemma follows.
Lemma 3 (Validity). Genesis blocks computed by honest parties before round 2l + 2, will be accepted by all honest parties in the next round.
Proof. Suppose honest party P i mined genesis block B at round m. According to Algorithm 1, B contains the challenge he has computed at the last round of the challenge-exchange phase. In addition, when the party broadcasts it, it includes the message sets A l+1 , . . . , A r , where A j contains the messages received by P i at round j and r = 2l + 2 − m. Since P i is honest, the following hold:
B is a valid block that contains H(A l+1 ); for r + 1 < j ≤ l + 1, A j contains H(A j−1 ); if c r is the challenge sent by some honest party at round r, then c r is contained in A r+1 ; and all honest parties are going to receive the message.
Thus, all honest parties are going to accept B at round m + 1 and the lemma follows.
Lemma 4 (Freshness). Let r ≤ l + 2. Every block computed before round r cannot be part of some chain with genesis block B, where w P (B) ≥ r − 1 for some honest party P , with overwhelming probability in the security parameter κ.
Weak chain growth. We now turn our attention to the weight of chains and prove a weak chain-growth property. In the original Bitcoin backbone protocol [21] , it was proved that chains grow at least at the rate of successful rounds, independently of the adversary's behavior. Here, at least initially, the chains of honest parties grow in a weak manner, in the sense that the adversary is able to slow down this growth by using his own blocks. Later on, we will show that after some specic round our protocol also achieves optimal chain growth.
Lemma 5. Let round r such that l + 2 ≤ r < 2l + 2, and suppose that at round r an honest party, say, P 1 has a chain C such that w P1 (C) = d. Then, by round s, where r ≤ s < 2l + 2, every honest party P will have received a chain C of weight at least w P (C ) = d − 2 + 3
Proof. (S ketch) Note that every time a uniquely successful round happens, the minimum weight over all parties' chains will increase by 2. Moreover, if the adversary has not diused any block in the same round the minimum weight increases by 3. By applying this result iteratively, the lemma follows. We refer the reader to the full version of the paper for the full proof.
Universal chain validity. A novelty of our construction is that the same genesis block may have dierent weight for dierent parties. Unfortunately, it could be the case that due to the adversary's inuence, a genesis block is valid for one party but invalid for another. This could lead to disagreement, in the sense that some honest parties may adopt a chain that others don't because it is not valid for them. We will show that with overwhelming probability such an event cannot occur for our protocol; as such, chain validity is a universal property; if some honest party accepts a chain C as valid, then C will also be valid for all other parties.
Notice, that in order to prove the following lemma we need l to be greater than a value that depends on 1/γ, i.e. the expected time it takes for honest parties to mine a block, and the security parameter κ (see also Remark 1). Intuitively l should be large enough so that (i) honest parties mine at least one block at this time interval, and (ii) any adversarial chain that is based on a genesis block broadcast at the end of the bootstraping phase will never be adopted by honest parties (because such genesis block will have too small weight in comparison).
Lemma 6. Suppose that for some δ ∈ (0, 1), 3(1 + δ)f < 1, l >
(1−δ)k/γ+3 1−3(1+δ)f , and γ ≥ (1 + δ)β, and that at round r an honest party P has chain C. Then C will also be valid for all other parties from this round on with probability 1−e
The complete version of the weak chain growth lemma follows from the argument we've made above.
Corollary 1. Suppose that for some δ ∈ (0, 1),
and γ ≥ (1 + δ)β. Let round r such that r ≥ l + 2, and suppose that at round r an honest party, say, P 1 has a chain C such that w P1 (C) = d. Then, by round s, where r ≤ s, every honest party P will have received a chain C of weight at least
i=r Z i with probability at most 1 − e −Ω(δ 2 k) .
Remark 3. Note further that the dependency of γ on n does not undermine the scalability of the round complexity of our protocol. This claim is argued on the basis that the diculty level D can be set proportional to 1/n, so that γ can be treated as a constant and then l is in essence independent of n (note that both parameters would be polynomials in κ).
A bound on adversarially precomputed blocks. The honest parties begin mining right after the challenge-exchange phase. Note that it does not help the adversary to precompute blocks before the challenge-exchange phase, except for the small probability of the event that some of his blocks happen to extend future blocks. We have shown that the adversary cannot create a private chain that honest parties will adopt if he starts mining at the rst round of the challengeexchange phase. It is though possible to start mining after the rst round in order to gain some advantage over the honest parties. The following lemma provides a bound on the number of blocks mined during the challenge-exchange phase with sucient weight so that they can be later used by the adversary.
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for some δ ∈ (0, 1). Let R be the set that contains any adversarial block B mined before round l + 2, where h(
Proof. (Sketch) We rst show that the adversary cannot take advantage of blocks which belong to chains whose genesis block was computed early on in the challenge exchange phase. Hence, with overwhelming probability she can only use blocks computed near the end of the challenge exchange phase; remember that the weight of a genesis block is small if it is mined early in the challenge exchange phase. By applying appropriate Cherno bounds the result follows. We refer the reader to the full version of the paper for the full proof.
We are now ready to prove the security properties listed in Section 2.2.
Common Prex. Every time a uniquely successful round happens all honest players converge to one chain, unless the adversary broadcasts some new block.
This turns out to be a very important fact and a consequence of it is described in the next lemma.
Lemma 8. Suppose block B in chain C is a u.s. block and consider a chain C
is not a genesis block, then B will also not be a genesis block.
Proof. Assume block B was mined at some round r. If B is not a genesis block, then for any honest block B mined before round r it should hold that (B ) ≤ (B) − 2. Otherwise, at round r no honest party would choose the parent of B to mine new blocks. If B is a genesis block, then no other honest party has mined a block in some previous round. On the other hand, for any honest block B mined after round r it must hold that (B ) ≥ (B) − 1 + 3 = (B) + 2, since honest parties will only extend chains of length at least (B)−1 after this round.
Thus, if a block with weight in the given interval exists, it must be adversarial.
For the sake of contradiction, suppose B is not a genesis block while B is a genesis block and let B be the parent of B. Then h C (B ) < C (B ) since h C (B ) ≤ C (B) − 2. This implies than every honest party received B before block B . But then, no honest party would mine on the parent of B, because he would have lower weight than B , which leads to a contradiction. Hence, the lemma follows.
We use Lemma 8 in order to show that the existence of a fork implies that the adversary has mined blocks proportional in number to the time the fork started.
1−3(1+δ)f , γ ≥ (1 + δ)β, for some real δ ∈ (0, 1). Let S be the set of the chains of the honest parties from round 2l + 2 and onwards of the bootstrapped backbone protocol. Then the probability that S does not satisfy the strong common-prex property with parameter k is at most e −Ω(δ 4 k) .
Proof. (Sketch.) We are going to use Lemma 8 to match u.s. blocks to adversarial ones. Function will help us show that the matched blocks are distinct; every pair of matched blocks is very close with respect to the function, while pairs of u.s. blocks can be very far under specic conditions. Initially, we construct such a matching whenever we have a fork between two chains C 1 , C 2 , either by matching adversarial blocks alternatively to each of the chains or by matching consecutive u.s. blocks on the same chain to consecutive adversarial blocks in the other chain.
Using this result, we prove that if a deep enough fork exists, the adversary must have mined more blocks than his hashing power allows, which leads to a contradiction. In more detail, the initial fork implies the existence of some honestly mined block B that is part of the common prex of the two chains.
Starting from B we construct a matching of all u.s. blocks mined after it, by picking deeper and deeper forks and repeatedly applying the matching procedure. Using the upper bound on precomputed blocks established in Lemma 7,  we can show that the adversary is able to mine a sucient number of blocks only with negligible probability. Hence, the theorem follows.
Chain Growth. We proved that after round 2l + 1 the strong common-prex property is satised. This implies that all players share a common genesis block after this round. The next lemma shows that this is sucient in order to get chain growth at the same level as in the original Backbone protocol. Lemma 9 . Suppose that at round r an honest party P 1 has a chain C of weight w P1 (C) = d and all honest parties after round r − 1 adopt chains that share the same genesis block B. Then, by round s ≥ r, every honest party P will have received a chain C of weight at least w P (C ) = d − 1 + 3
Proof. Since all parties adopt chains with the same genesis block after round r − 1, and P 1 has adopted a chain C of weight d, there are two cases: either (1) C = d − 1 and any chain that honest parties adopt after round r − 1 has a weight that is congruent to d or d − 1 modulo 3, or (2) C = d and the weight is congruent to d or d + 1 modulo 3. This observation is implied from the fact that each extra block adds 3 units of weight to the chain and B can only have two dierent weights under the views of honest parties.
It is sucient to study only one of the two cases so w.l.o.g. suppose that the weight of the chains is congruent to d or d − 1 modulo 3. The proof is by induction on s − r ≥ 0. For the basis (s = r), observe that if at round r P 1 has a chain C of weight w P1 (C) = d, then he broadcast C at an earlier round (than r). It follows that every honest party P will receive C by round r and w P (C) ≥ d−1.
For the inductive step, note that by the inductive hypothesis every honest party P has received a chain C of weight at least w P (C )
i=r X i by round s − 1. When X s−1 = 0 the statement follows directly, so assume X s−1 = 1. Observe that every honest party queried the oracle with a chain of weight at least d at round s − 1. It follows that every honest party P successful at round s − 1 broadcast a chain C of weight at least w P (C ) = d + 3. Chain Quality. We rst observe a consequence of Theorem 1.
Lemma 10.
1−3(1+δ)f , γ ≥ (1 + δ)β, for some real δ ∈ (0, 1). From round 2l + 2 and onwards of the bootstrapped backbone protocol, the probability that the adversary has a chain which is more than k blocks longer than the chain of some honest party is at most e −Ω(δ 4 k) .
Proof. Given any execution and an adversary that at a round r has a chain C which is k blocks longer than the chain C of an honest party P , we can dene an adversary such that at round r + 1 the common-prex property does not hold for parameter k. The adversary simply sends C to P = P at round r.
1−3(1+δ)f , γ ≥ (1 + δ)β, for some real δ ∈ (0, 1 /2). Suppose C belongs to an honest party and consider any k consecutive blocks of C computed after round 2l+2 of the bootstrapped backbone protocol. The probability that the adversary has contributed more than (1 + Proof. Note that the next two events occur with probability at least 1 − e
for any δ ∈ (0, 1). The honest parties in the rst l + 1 rounds have computed at most α(1 + δ)(l + 1) blocks. The adversary, who might have been mining also during the challenges phase, has computed at most 2β(1 + δ)(l + 1). The statement then follows from Theorem 3, since α(1 + δ)(l + 1) + 2β(1 + δ)(l + 1) < 2f (1 + δ)(l + 1).
of all transactions that honest parties can agree on as well as add their own, despite the potentially disruptive behavior of parties harnessing less than 1/2 of the hashing power. This entails proving that the ledger's required security properties (Persistence and Liveness cf. [21] ) hold in a genesis block-less setting.
Next, we consider the problem of setting up a PKI in our unauthenticated network setting from scratch, i.e., without any trusted setup. As mentioned in Section 1, the idea of using POWs as an identity-assignment tool was put forth by Aspnes et al. [2] . Here we build on this idea as well as on the 2-for-1 POWs technique from [21] to use our bootstrapped protocol to assign identities to parties. The assignment relation will possibly assign more than one identities to the same party, while guaranteeing that the majority of them is assigned to honest parties.
Finally, applying the 2-for-1 POWs technique we can also solve the consensus (aka Byzantine agreement) problem [36, 31] without any trusted setup, even if the adversary has almost the same hashing power as the honest parties, and in a number of rounds independent of the number of parties. Indeed, all our protocols have round complexity linear in the security parameter, and enjoy simultaneous termination.
Compared to other works, most notably [1] , our approach is dierent in the order in which it sets up a bulletin board and assigns identities to parties. We choose to rst establish the formeri.e., the ledgerand then assign the identities; in contrast, in [1] identities are established rst in a graded manner, and then using that infrastructure the parties can implement a broadcast channel.
We now turn to the applications in detail.
Robust public transaction ledger. A public transaction ledger is dened with respect to a set of valid ledgers L and a set of valid transactions T , each one possessing an ecient membership test. A ledger x ∈ L is a vector of sequences of transactions tx ∈ T . Each transaction tx may be associated with one or more accounts. Ledgers correspond to chains in the backbone protocol. In the protocol execution there also exists an oracle Txgen that generates valid transactions.
Note, that it is possible for the adversary to create two transactions that are conicting; valid ledgers must not contain conicting transaction. We will assume that the oracle is unambiguous, i.e., that the adversary cannot create transactions that come in`conict' with the transactions generated by the oracle. A transaction is called neutral if there does not exist any transactions that comes in conict with it.
In order to turn the backbone protocol into a protocol realizing a public transaction ledger suitable denitions were given for functions V (·), R(·), I(·) in [21] . Namely, V ( x 1 , . . . , x m ) is true if its input is a valid ledger. Function R(C) returns the contents of the chain if they constitute a valid ledger, otherwise it is undened. Finally, I(st, C, round, INPUT(), RECEIVE()) returns the largest subsequence of transactions in the input and receive tapes that constitute a valid ledger, with respect to the contents of the chain the party already has, together with a randomly generated neutral transaction. We denote the instantiation of our protocol with these functions by Π Boot PL . For more details we refer to [21] .
Denition 8. A protocol Π implements a robust public transaction ledger in the q-bounded synchronous setting without trusted setup if there is a round r 0 so that the following two properties are satised:
Persistence: Parameterized by k ∈ N (the depth parameter), if in a certain round after r 0 an honest player reports a ledger that contains a transaction tx in a block more than k blocks away from the end of the ledger, then tx will always be reported in the same position in the ledger by any honest player from this round on.
Liveness: Parameterized by u, k ∈ N (the wait time and depth parameters, resp.), provided that a transaction either (i) issued by Txgen, or (ii) is neutral, is given as input to all honest players continuously for u consecutive rounds after round r 0 , then there exists an honest party who will report this transaction at a block more than k blocks from the end of the ledger.
Chain quality, chain growth and the strong common prex property were shown in [27] to be sucient to implement such a ledger 10 in a black-box manner.
Our protocol satises all these properties after a specic condition is met. Chain quality holds after the 2f (1 + δ)(l + 1) block in the chain of any player, as Corollary 2 dictates, and common prex and chain growth hold after round 2l + 2, according to Theorem 1. Finally, due to chain growth, after at most (2(1 + δ)(1 − δ)f /γ + 2)(l + 1) ≤ 14(l + 1) rounds all necessary conditions will have been met with overwhelming probability. Fast PKI setup. Next, we use the ledger to generate an honest majority PKI from scratch in a number of rounds that is linear in the security parameter 11 . The rst idea that we are going to use is that of a 2-for-1 POW described in [21] . At a high level, the technique allows to do combined mining for two POW schemes in the price of one. In more detail, we can add additional information in the queries to the random oracle, and if the response to the query is less than some value 10 A similar denitional approach was pursued in [34] .
11 For this subsection we assume that the adversary is static.
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T 1 , then we consider it a valid POW of type 1; if it is greater than some value T 2 we consider it as a valid POW of type 2. T 1 and T 2 should be appropriately chosen so that the events of success in either of these POWs are independent.
The second POW is used to mine transactions, in the same way blocks are mined. This guarantees that the number of transactions is proportional to the hashing power of each player. By having parties broadcast their transactions on one hand, and making sure that at least one honest block that contains these transactions is in the chain of all honest parties due to liveness on the other hand, the protocol in [21] manages to achieve consensus assuming an honest-majority hashing power.
In our case, transactions will contain the public keys, and in this way we will obtain an honest-majority PKI. However, in contrast with [21] , we cannot let parties start mining transactions from the beginning of the execution, since the adversary would have some additional precomputation time. Instead, we are going to wait for the public ledger to be established, and then use some and only two comparisons, we will be mining POWs of both types at the same time. Moreover, if log(T 1 ) + log(T 2 ) is less than κ, where κ is the size of the hash's output, then the events of succeeding in any of the two POWs are independent, since they depend on dierent bits of the hash which are sampled independently and uniformly at random by the random oracle.
Next, we describe our protocol Π
Initialization. P runs Π Boot PL , as described so far, until she receives a chain of length at least L 1 . We choose L 1 so that it is guaranteed that all security properties hold, and about k new blocks have been inserted in the commonprex of the chains of all honest players.
2-for-1 mining. Let C be P 's chain at the end of the initialization phase.
From now on, she is going to do 2-for-1 POW mining, and include in her transaction POWs (i) the hash of the (L 1 − k)-th block of C, and (ii) a randomly generated public key for which she has stored the corresponding secret key. Obviously, a new key must be generated every time she starts mining a new transaction. Whenever P mines a new transaction, she diuses it to the network, and whenever she receives one, she includes it in the transactions of the block she is mining.
The rst time P receives a chain of length greater or equal to L 2 , she runs the Key extraction procedure (below). The phase ends at round L2 (1−δ)γ , where P runs the Termination procedure. Key extraction. P extracts and stores a set of keys from her current chain according to the following rules: If chain C is her chain at this round, she stores any public key which belongs to a transaction that (i) is in the rst L 2 −k blocks of C , and (ii) the hash of the block contained in the transaction matches the hash of the (L 1 − k)-th block in her chain. Termination. P outputs the keys from the key extraction phase and terminates.
Next, we prove that a consistent PKI with an honest majority is generated at the end of the execution of protocol Π PKI PL . Two properties are guaranteed: (1) honest parties output the same set of keys and (2) more than half of these keys have been generated by them. For the rest of this section let α 2 , β 2 , f 2 be the corresponding values of α, β, f for the diculty level T 2 , e.g. f 2 = nq Proof. (Sketch) First, note that the adversary can start precomputing transactions at most 2k/γ rounds before the honest parties. Otherwise, she will be unable to predict the hash of their chain as dictated by our protocol, since by the chain quality property the chain of each honest player will contain an honest block near the tail of the chain. Moreover, again by the chain quality and common prex properties, the adversary will stop mining transactions at most 2k/γ rounds after the honest parties. After this round, she will be unable to insert her transactions deep enough in the chain for the honest parties to take them into account. Finally, by choosing an appropriate value for δ, we are sure that the number of keys mined by the honest parties is greater than the number of keys mined by the adversary.
Remark 4. To better understand Π PKI PL we compute dierent parameters of the system for the Bitcoin network parameters. Assume that f = 2%, α = 1.33%, γ = 1.31%, β = 0.6%, k = 10, and δ = 0.25. The choice of f approximately corresponds to a rate of one block per 10 minutes with a round duration of about 12 seconds; the adversary's hashing power is half of that of the honest parties. Then, l ≈ 623, which corresponds in terms of rounds to about 2 hours. Moreover, if we set f 2 to be equal to f /k we have that 80 < N < 600. We note that the parameters of Bitcoin are quite conservative and that's why our runtime suers.
In principle, by carefully analyzing and re-engineering our protocol we can get tighter bounds; many of the design decisions we got here, were made to aid the readability of our work.
Remark 5. The probability that some honest party succeeds in mining at least one transaction is: , each party will obtain at least one key with probability at least 1 − , for any ∈ (0, 1). Note here that T 2 and κ must be carefully chosen to retain the independence of the 2 POWs. In case this is not possible, the 2-for-1 mining phase may be extended.
Consensus and other applications. Next, we describe how Π PKI PL can be used in other contexts. First, a direct application of our protocol is in the context of proof of stake protocols. In this type of protocols, blocks are mined by randomly selecting stake holders with probability proportional to their stake. A typical requirement for bootstrapping such protocols (e.g. [28, 30] ), is that in the initial state of the economy the majority of the coins is controlled by honest parties. By assigning one coin to each public key produced by our protocol, we can eciently and securely bootstrap a proof of stake protocol.
A more general application of Π PKI PL is in solving consensus (aka Byzantine agreement) [36, 31] , with no trusted setup, and in a number of rounds independent of the number of parties. If parties submit transactions containing their input instead of public keys, it follows that by taking the majority of their output they are going to achieve Byzantine agreement. That is, everyone will agree on the same value (the Agreement property), and if all honest parties have the same input v, they are all going to output v (Validity).
Finally, our protocol for the establishment of an honest-majority PKI enables the application of traditional Byzantine fault-tolerant techniques for ledger creation and maintenance based on subcommittees as opposed to mining (cf. [7] ) to permissionless networks. Instead of having arbitrary membership authorities, these committees can be elected using our protocol with the guarantee of an honest majority. Note that by changing the diculty of the transaction-level POW we can force the number of parties in the committee to be in a specic predened interval.
Reducing the communication cost. While the round complexity of our protocol is independent of the number of parties, this does not hold for its com- factor. We can redesign the challenge-exchange phase so that the number of different messages diused by honest parties is independent of their number, and only depends on the security parameter and the precomputation time available to the adversary. 12 We do this in the following way: instead of having all parties sent a random challenge in order to be sure that the genesis blocks that are later mined are fresh, we demand that each random challenge be accompanied by a POW. This way, all honest parties will be sure that at least one honest challenge is generated with high probability every O(κ) rounds. Moreover, honest parties will only diuse random challenges that are tied to a POW. Thus, the total number of dierent messages sent will be upper-bounded by the number of POWs that the adversary and the honest parties combined have generated.
Also, again dierent honest parties will have received the same block with at most one round dierence. By combining the above ideas, we can again create a graded-agreement-type procedure for the genesis blocks and in the same way achieve consensus. We defer further details to the full version of the paper.
